

PLUTARCH, CALLISTHENES AND THE PEACE OF CALLIAS

THE continuing and polemical debate over the authenticity of the Peace of Callias has become so complicated that it would be a positive service to scholarship to remove some of the more contentious evidence and reduce the scope of the argument. That is the object of this article. A fragment of Callisthenes has bulked very large in the modern literature. According to the received view the Olynthian historian denied the existence of a formal peace between Athens and the Persian King and alleged that the King observed a *de facto* limit to his empire, never venturing west of the Chelidonian islands.¹ For sceptics this is grist to the mill. A writer of the mid-fourth century rejected the Athenian patriotic tradition, and it is assumed that he had good reason to do so.² On the other hand defenders of the authenticity of the Peace stumble over Callisthenes' apparent denial and are forced to counter-denial or to sophistry.³ What is common to both camps is a tendency to refer to the evidence of Callisthenes without noting that the original text is lost. The 'fragment' (which it is not)⁴ is preserved by Plutarch in a sophisticated passage of source criticism and due attention needs to be paid to his mode of citation. Only then can we begin to elicit what Callisthenes may have said and reconstruct the probable context in his historical exposition. As always, we need to approach the unknown through proper study of the known.

I. WHAT PLUTARCH SAYS

The reference to Callisthenes comes in a complicated passage of Plutarch's *Life of Cimon*. Plutarch first deals with the campaign of the Eurymedon, creating a composite narrative out of the mutually contradictory reports of Ephorus, Callisthenes and the Atthidographer, Phanodemus.⁵ Having concluded his story of the battle he adds that the engagement so demoralised the Persian King that he contracted the celebrated peace, which involved his keeping a day's ride from the Aegean coast and not sailing beyond Cyanae and the Chelidonian islands with a warship (13.4). That categorical statement is contrasted first with Callisthenes, then with the transcript of the treaty made in the third century BC by Craterus and finally with unidentified reports of an altar to Peace dedicated at Athens because of the treaty and honours conferred upon the Athenian ambassador Callias.⁶

¹ This is the most conservative interpretation of the fragment, as found for instance in Luisa Prandi, *Callistene: uno storico tra Aristotele e i re macedoni* (Milan 1985) 53-4.

² See, in particular, K. Meister, *Die Ungeschichtigkeit des Kalliasfriedens und deren historische Folgen* (Palingenesia xviii: Wiesbaden 1982) 12-15, 34, 58-66, with full citation of earlier literature. Cf. H. T. Wade-Gery, *Essays in Greek history* (Oxford 1958) 204: 'the unknown arguments which may have moved Callisthenes remain one of the most potent weapons in the armoury of doubt'.

³ A summary is conveniently provided by Meister (above, n. 2) 14. Usually Callisthenes is assumed to have been in error: see, most recently, the massive article by Ernst Badian, 'The Peace of Callias', *JHS* cvii (1987) 1-39, esp. 18: 'knowing little about the political history of Athens, thought that the first reported peace was due to confusion with the later . . . one'. Otherwise it is assumed that Plutarch misreported Callisthenes (so E. Meyer,

Forschungen zur alten Geschichte ii [Halle 1899] 4-5) or that Callisthenes did know of some form of the treaty. Wade-Gery (above, n. 2) 204 suggested that he was influenced by the doubts of Theopompus and preferred to refer to the *de facto* situation after the Eurymedon, while John Walsh, 'The authenticity and the dates of the Peace of Callias and the Congress Decree', *Chiron* xi (1981) 31-63, esp. 46-9, argued that Callisthenes rejected specific clauses of the Peace while accepting in general the historicity of the compact.

⁴ 'Fragments' should properly imply verbal quotation. It has recently been suggested that *reliquiae* is a more appropriate term: P. A. Brunt, 'On historical fragments and epitomes', *CQ* xxx (1980) 477-94 (note his collection, p. 479, of misquotations of Herodotus in Plutarch's *De malignitate Herodoti*).

⁵ *Plut. Cim.* 12.5-13.3 = Jacoby, *FGrH* 70 F 192, 124 F 15, 325 F 22.

⁶ *Plut. Cim.* 13.4-5 = *FGrH* 124 F 16, 342 F 13.

It cannot be denied that Plutarch is discussing the historicity of the Peace of Callias, in which he believed, and he adduces the report of the decree given by Craterus as evidence of its authenticity alongside anonymous writers who associated the Peace with the altar at Athens.⁷ In other words it is an excursus on an issue which was contentious in Plutarch's own day, not unlike the discussion (say) of the date of Lycurgus.⁸ Variant reports are assessed and evaluated against each other. Now Craterus is alleged to have given a transcript of the treaty as a historical fact (ἀντίγραφα συνθηκῶν ὡς γενομένων κατατέτακται). That implies that the previous material, from Callisthenes, shed some doubt on the historicity of the Peace. The vast majority of scholars have taken it as axiomatic that he actually denied that the peace was concluded and see confirmation in Plutarch's wording. There is first a categorical statement that the King made peace and accepted the two restrictive territorial clauses. Then Plutarch adduces the evidence of Callisthenes: καίτοι Καλλισθένης οὐ φησι ταῦτα συνθέσθαι τὸν βάρβαρον, ἔργω δὲ ποιεῖν διὰ τὸν φόβον τῆς ἥττης ἐκείνης (*Cim.* 13.4). Almost invariably the sentence is translated as follows:⁹ 'and yet Callisthenes denies that the barbarian made this compact but (claims) that as a matter of fact he acted in this way, because of the fear inspired by that defeat'. If the translation is correct, we must inevitably conclude that Callisthenes declared himself against the historicity of the Peace of Callias.

But is that so? In my opinion there has been a pervasive error in the interpretation of the key phrase. The crux is the meaning of οὐ φησι in the main clause, which is regularly taken in its usual sense 'denies'. That usage is, of course, amply attested in Plutarch, but it seems confined to simple statements, where a single fact is rejected.¹⁰ Here the sentence is compound; there is a contrast between what Callisthenes does not say and what he does. It is not a contrast unique either to the *Life of Cimon* or to Plutarch, and it has a distinct rhetorical pedigree. In general, I would argue, the meaning is not 'denies X and maintains Y' but 'does not say X but says Y'.¹¹ In other words the idiom draws attention to an omission of significant detail and reports what variant material is actually given. An obvious instance where we can check the original is provided by Aeschines in his speech *On the Embassy*. There Aeschines records what he said in the great debate of Scirophorion 346, quoting the suspicions of Cleochares of Chalcis about the secret diplomacy of larger states. Demosthenes perverted this, he claims, into a promise that Philip would surrender Euboea to Athens—ταῦτα οὐ διηγῆσασθαι με

⁷ These authorities cannot be identified, but they were obviously in error. It is clear that the altar to Peace was established in the aftermath of the Common Peace of 375, as was attested by Philochorus (*FGrH* 328 F151; cf. Isocr. xv 110; Nepos *Timoth.* 2.2). See the exhaustive commentary by Jacoby, *FGrH* iiiB (Suppl.)/1 (Text), 522–6.

⁸ Plut. *Lyc.* 1. The discussion in the *Life of Cimon* is relatively uncomplicated. For a more elaborate example compare the excursus on Alexander and the Amazon Queen (Plut. *Alex.* 46).

⁹ This is my own translation, which corresponds to Perrin's in the Loeb edition and which, I think, does justice to the *communis opinio*. There are occasionally variants, such as in W. R. Connor, *Theopompus and fifth century Athens* (Washington 1968) 84: 'Callisthenes says that the barbarian did not make such an agreement . . .'; but Connor has no hesitation in arguing that Callisthenes 'attempted to refute a tradition that a formal peace

was arranged.'

¹⁰ E.g. Plut. *Agis* 2.5; *Lucull.* 28.8; *Mor.* 871C (cf. Hdt. viii.112). For a slightly more elaborate example see *Mor.* 435B (with Eur. *Cyc.* 334). But I can find no clear instance where the formula introduces a variant with the sense 'this is denied by X'.

¹¹ This was suggested long ago by Eduard Meyer (above, n. 3), and it was seriously considered by Wade-Gery (above, n. 2) 203. But Wade-Gery accepted the traditional location of the discussion in Callisthenes' *Hellenica* and the traditional theory that the point of departure was the King's Peace (see below, p. 5); in other words, if Callisthenes had known of and believed in the Peace of Callias, he must have mentioned it in the context. As will be seen, the traditional theory is fallacious, and the linguistic parallels, hitherto not adduced, overwhelmingly support the minority view.

φησίν ἄλλ' ἐπηγγέλθαι τὴν Εὐβοίαν παραδώσειν.¹² Now Demosthenes did not *deny* that Aeschines reported his conversation with Cleochaes. What he did was to misrepresent it, stating (falsely) that the Euboeans had wind of an agreement to place Euboea in Athenian hands. It is only the second clause that refers to what Demosthenes actually said: 'he does not say that I reported these statements, rather that I promised to hand over Euboea'.¹³

When we revert to Plutarch, we find the idiom at least a dozen times in the *Lives* alone. In each case it is a question of comparing variant sources, and in each case what is addressed is a significant silence. There is a clear instance in the *Life of Marius*, where Plutarch reports the tradition that Sulla sought and found refuge in the house of Marius when he was in flight from the forces of the tribune, Sulpicius Rufus. To counter that report he adduces Sulla's autobiography, where the dictator claimed that he visited Marius as a matter of policy (αὐτὸς δὲ Σύλλας ἐν τοῖς ὑπομνήμασιν οὐ φησι καταφυγεῖν πρὸς τὸν Μάριον ἄλλ' ἀπαλλαχθῆναι βουλευσόμενος...) ¹⁴ It would seem most unlikely that the dictator deliberately drew attention to an act of generosity on the part of his rival. When he wrote his autobiography (before there was any written tradition to counter), it was in his interest merely to give his preferred version, that he was taken to the house of Marius by superior force and emerged to comply with the demands of Sulpicius. That is the version Plutarch gives in the *Life of Sulla*,¹⁵ a unitary account with no denial of the rival tradition, implying that Marius was in collusion with Sulpicius (the variant tradition made him a free agent and benefactor of Sulla). Sulla, then, did not *deny* that he found shelter with Marius: he said nothing about the tradition and gave a version more flattering to himself.

Other examples are less conclusive, but they combine to corroborate the pattern. The dream of Calpurnia shortly before Caesar's assassination is reported in two versions, the first simply that she was holding the murdered dictator in her arms, the second that the honorific gable ornament on Caesar's house broke away. Plutarch introduces the second tradition with the statement: οἱ δ' οὐ φασὶ τῇ γυναικὶ ταύτην γενέσθαι τὴν ὄψιν (*Caes.* 63.9). As before, it is likely that he was simply drawing attention to the silence of the sources. They said nothing about the first dream, reporting only the vision of the fallen gable. These portents are reported elsewhere, some authors (like Appian) giving one, others (Suetonius and Dio) both;¹⁶ but nowhere is there any hint of a denial in the sources.¹⁷ The variant about Crassus' death is much the same, According to Plutarch he was killed by a Parthian named Pomaxathres: οἱ δ' οὐ φασὶν ἄλλ' ἕτερον

¹² Aesch. ii 120. Aeschines is referring explicitly to the exposition at Dem. xix 22, where Demosthenes quotes the alleged statements of (unnamed) Euboean delegates, mentioning rumours ὅτι ... Φίλιππος δ' ὑμῖν Εὐβοίαν ὠμολόγηκεν παραδώσειν. For the historical background see G. L. Cawkwell 'Euboea in the late 340's', *Phoenix* xxxii (1978) 48-9.

¹³ The idiom recurs more explicitly a paragraph earlier, where Aeschines claims that Demosthenes turned his statement that he believed it right that Thebes should be Boeotian into a promise that Philip would actually bring that about: τοῦτο οὐκ ἀπαγγεῖλαι ἄλλ' ὑποσχέσθαι μέ φησιν. (Aesch. ii 119; cf. Dem. xix 20-1).

¹⁴ Plut. *Mar.* 35.4 = Peter *HRR* i. 199 (F 11). For the literary and historical background see A. Passerini, 'Gaio Mario come uomo politico', *Athenaeum* xii (1934) 363-4; I. Calabi, 'I commentarii di Silla come fonte storica', *RAL* iii. 5 (1950)

280-1.

¹⁵ Plut. *Sull.* 8.7; cf. App. *BC* i 56.247.

¹⁶ App. *BC* ii 115.481; Val. Max. i 7.2; Suet. *Caes.* 81.3; Dio xlv 17.1. Nicolaus of Damascus (*FGrH* 90 F 130 [23.83], simply mentioned a number of dreams experienced by Calpurnia and did not give their content. The variant tradition of the falling gable, which Plutarch specifically attributes to Livy, recurs in *Obsequens* 67 without reference to any other story.

¹⁷ For a similar account of portents compare Plut. *Brut.* 48.2, where the famous report of the appearance of Caesar's ghost is contrasted with the story of Brutus' contemporary and intimate, P. Volumnius (Peter *HRR* ii.52 [F 1]), that one of the eagles became infested by bees (τοῦτο μὲν οὐ λέγει τὸ σημεῖον, μελισσῶν δὲ φησὶ...). Once again Plutarch draws attention not to a denial but to a variant report.

εἶναι τὸν ἀποκτείνοντα.¹⁸ It is unlikely that the variant tradition explicitly denied that the killer was Pomaxathres. More probably it simply reported a different name and Plutarch noted the disagreement. The same applies to the discussion of the course of the river Cyrus in the *Life of Pompey*. Plutarch contrasts the report of his main historical source, that the Araxes joins it before its delta, with a variant that the two rivers have separate courses and enter the Caspian at different points.¹⁹ Both traditions recur elsewhere and, once again, there is no trace of debate or polemic.²⁰ The overwhelming probability is that Plutarch simply reported the version of his principal narrative source (which he shared with Appian) and added that other sources known to him gave a different description.²¹

The only notice of this type which seems to me ambiguous comes in the *Life of Nicias*. There Plutarch cites Timaeus' account of the deaths of Demosthenes and Nicias: 'he does not say (οὐ φησιν) that they died at the behest of the Syracusans, as was recorded by Philistus and Thucydides, but claims that they committed suicide while the assembly was still in session, after Hermocrates sent word to them'.²² Given Timaeus' known penchant for criticism of earlier writers,²³ it is certainly possible that he referred to Philistus and Thucydides by name and rejected their accounts. But the parallels cited (and the fact that Plutarch gives no details of Timaeus' argumentation) in my opinion tip the balance towards a simple variant.²⁴ Elsewhere Plutarch tends to be explicit when a tradition is rejected by his sources and speaks openly of fiction. If Timaeus had inveighed against the historicity of Thucydides' and Philistus' version, Plutarch should have made it clear, as he does, say, with the story of Alexander's relations with the Amazon Queen or the criticisms of Solon's interview with Croesus.²⁵ The same applied to Callisthenes and the Peace of Callias. If he had denied the existence of the peace, then it was natural for Plutarch to have signalled the fact. Where we have the simple formula οὐ φησι/φασι, it is most economical to suppose that he is merely reporting a variant.

We can no longer assume that Callisthenes denied the existence of a peace after Eurymedon. All Plutarch does is to emphasise that he said nothing about such a peace but drew attention to the actual behaviour of the King, who took no defensive measures even after Pericles and Ephialtes led naval forces east of the Chelidonian islands. What led Plutarch to express himself in the form that he does? I would suggest that it was primarily a piece of rhetorical embellishment on his part. By the second century AD it was an established literary *topos* that the victory of Eurymedon forced the Persian King to accept a humiliating peace, whose two principal clauses were the prohibition against venturing by land within a day's ride of the sea and by sea beyond Cyanae and the Chelidonians. That was the formulation of Demosthenes in his speech *On the Embassy*.²⁶

¹⁸ Plut. *Crass.* 31.7. For other reports of Crassus' death see Dio xl 27.2.

¹⁹ Plut. *Pomp.* 34.3: οἱ δ' οὐ φασι τούτω συμφέρεσθαι τὸν Ἀράξην ἀλλὰ καθ' ἑαυτὸν, ἐγγύς δὲ ποιείσθαι τὴν ἐκβολὴν εἰς ταυτὸ πέλαγος.

²⁰ App. *Mithr.* 103.480 repeats the first tradition in Plutarch, agreeing on the twelve mouths of the delta and the variant spelling Cynus (*cf.* Dio xxxvi 53.5), and Pliny, *NH* vi 26, alleges that it was majority opinion that the Araxes flowed into the Cyrus. On the other hand Strabo repeatedly gives the alternative version that the rivers had separate courses (xi 1.5 [491], 4.2 [501], 14.3–4 [527–8], 14.13 [531]: so apparently Mela iii 40–1) and there is no hint of any polemic.

²¹ See also Plut. *Publ.* 19.8 (= *Mor.* 250 F), The variant tradition here recorded seems that of Dion. Hal. v 34.3, where there is no detail (or record) of any other story. One may add Plut. *Caes.* 53.5, a

unique report for which there is no control source: once again it seems a simple variant, an aberrant account of Caesar's role at Thapsus (*cf.* M. Gelzer, *Caesar* [Oxford 1968] 268 n. 3).

²² Plut. *Nic.* 28.5 = Timaeus *FGrH* 566 F 101.

²³ Polyb. xii 4a, 23 (with Walbank's commentary ad loc.); *FGrH* 566 T 1, 11, 16–19, 23, 27,

²⁴ Jacoby, *FGrH* iii B(Kommentar) Text, 582–3, argues that Timaeus consciously falsified the record to the greater glory of Hermocrates, filling the rhetorical gap left by Thucydides and Philistus and (implicitly) reacting against the account of Ephorus (*cf.* Diod. xiii 19 ff.). There was no direct polemic here, but idiosyncratic elaboration.

²⁵ Plut. *Alex.* 46.2 (πλάσμα φασὶ γεγονέναι τούτω); *Sol.* 27.1 (ὡς πεπλάσμενην). See also *Alex.* 77.5; *Them.* 32.4.

²⁶ Dem. xix 273 (so Lycurg. i 73); *cf.* Meister (above, n. 2) 16–18.

It was adopted by Aelius Aristeides, who followed Isocrates' model in contrasting the King's Peace unfavourably with the terms of the Peace of Callias but also, in a very different context, used the Peace as a debating point to enhance the glory of the Romans whose empire was not bounded by the Cyanaeae, the Chelidonians or a day's ride from the sea.²⁷ The same clauses are echoed by Himerius (vi 29) in the fourth century AD, and there is no doubt that they were firmly established in the stock repertory of rhetorical clichés.

When Plutarch researched his material for the *Life of Cimon*, he clearly believed that the Peace of Callias was a direct sequel to the campaign of Eurymedon, and he presumably found a report to that effect in one of his sources, no doubt the Atthidographer, Phanodemus, whose work had a tendency to panegyric of Athens and was composed in the latter half of the fourth century,²⁸ when the Peace was extolled by the orators as one of the glories of the city. Callisthenes by contrast had no reference to the Peace itself, but he did refer to the Chelidonian islands as a self-imposed boundary of the Persian Empire beyond which the King did not venture and within which he did not assert himself. That inspired Plutarch to draw attention to the clauses of the Peace which were standard in his day and to comment that Callisthenes had no reference to the Peace itself but mentioned the Chelidonian islands in a different context, as a *de facto* boundary of the Persian Empire. The suspicions that are evoked by the absence of a reference to the Peace are immediately countered by the documentary evidence of Craterus and the dedication of the altar to Peace. There is no necessary—or likely—implication that Callisthenes denied the existence of the peace. Plutarch names him as a significant variant, a source which did not mention the peace when he might have been expected to do so and whose silence by implication cast doubt on the historicity of the episode.

II. WHAT CALLISTHENES MIGHT HAVE SAID

The entire context of Plutarch's citations of Callisthenes is problematical. The material relates to the battle of the Eurymedon and its sequel, but the period of the *pentekontaetia* was not covered in any attested work of Callisthenes.²⁹ It probably comes from a digression, but what could be the context? There is an easy and traditional answer. It comes from the introductory portion of the *Hellenica*, Callisthenes' ten book coverage of the thirty year period between the King's Peace (387/6) and the outbreak of the Sacred War (356).³⁰ The choice of the King's Peace as a starting point is conceived as a political manifesto in its own right, placing Callisthenes in the panhellenic tradition of thought represented by Isocrates. As Isocrates' *Panegyric* drew a contrast between the immediate disgrace of the King's Peace and the glorious tradition of the Peace of Callias,³¹ so Callisthenes compared the present with the past and wrote an introductory digression setting the relations between Greek and Persian in their proper historical context. The great Athenian victories and their political consequences in the fifth century formed an ironical counterpoint to the sordid political intrigue that resulted in the King's Peace.³²

²⁷ Arist. i (*Panath.*) 274, 209; xxvi (*Rom.*) 10; cf. Meister (above, n. 2) 18–20.

²⁸ Jacoby, *FGrH* iii B (suppl.)/1 (Text), 172–3, argues that Phanodemus began his work sometime between 340 and 335. If Badian's complex argument (above, n. 3, 15–17) is sound, Ephorus also referred to an earlier peace contracted after Eurymedon and could also have inspired Plutarch's excursus.

²⁹ For convenient reviews of Callisthenes' liter-

ary output see Prandi (above, n. 1); L. Pearson, *The lost histories of Alexander the Great* (Philological Monographs 20: New York 1960) 22–49; P. Pédech, *Historiens compagnons d'Alexandre* (Paris 1984) 15–69.

³⁰ *FGrH* 124 T 27 (Diod. xiv 117.8; xvi 14.4)

³¹ Isocr. iv (*Pan.*) 120; cf. Meister (above, n. 2) 8–11.

³² For fullest expression of the theory see Pédech (above, n. 28) 27–8, 30–1, Prandi (above, n. 1) 53–4.

The theory is superficially attractive,³³ but it is based on nothing more than wishful thinking. I do not see how the choice of the King's Peace as a point of departure proves anything about Callisthenes' political orientation. It was a key episode in fourth century history, marking the recovery of Spartan supremacy in Greece and with it the dissolution of the Boeotian confederacy. The Persian role in these transactions could well be seen as secondary. One might compare the preface of Diodorus xv, which is probably taken from Ephorus and comes in the immediate aftermath of the King's Peace.³⁴ There is violent censure of the Spartans, but the Persians play no role in the polemic. The emphasis is on the Spartan abuse of hegemony which led to the alienation of their own allies. That is rightly seen as the dominant theme of the period, and there is no evidence that Callisthenes had any other perspective in the *Hellenica*. The fragments, admittedly scanty, give no indication of any preoccupation with Greco-Persian relations, nor do any of the extant texts, such as Plutarch's *Life of Pelopidas*,³⁵ which are considered to be directly influenced by Callisthenes. He appears to have dealt (as one would expect) with the great Persian invasion of Egypt in 374, commenting upon the phenomenon of the Nile floods,³⁶ but we cannot trace any Isocratean zeal for a united Greek front against the barbarian. There is also the question of economy. We know that Callisthenes dealt with Sphodrias and his abortive invasion of Attica (378) in Book ii, and the battle of Tegyra (375) appeared in Book iii.³⁷ That presupposes a plethora of material in Book i: events such as the Spartan initiatives against Thebes, Mantinea and Olynthus and the protracted Persian campaigns against Evagoras of Salamis. There is little apparent space for a preliminary digression into the fifth century. One gains the distinct impression that Callisthenes' panhellenism was artificially conjured up to provide a home for the Eurymedon fragments.

But is there any acceptable alternative location? In 1900 Eduard Schwartz proposed briefly that the proper home for the digression was Callisthenes' work on Alexander, in particular his narrative of the Macedonian king's march through Pamphylia early in 333.³⁸ This suggestion was emphatically rejected by Jacoby in his classic article in Pauly-Wissowa (*RE* x. 1695–6) and immediately fell into the limbo of forgotten things. If the alternative location is mentioned at all, it tends to be dismissed perfunctorily.³⁹ Klaus Meister, for instance, echoes Jacoby and states dogmatically that the excursus comes

³³ Best stated, with admirable rhetoric, by Jacoby, *RE* x. 1694: 'Dieser Friede bedeutet für jeden Griechen, der sich über die engen Grenzen seiner vaterstädtischen Interessen zu erheben vermochte, einen Schandfleck für den griechischen Namen'. It is, I think, more an expression of the Pan-German sentiment of the early twentieth century than a reflection of fourth-century Panhellenic thought.

³⁴ Diod. xv 1.1–5. The subsequent narrative, certainly based on Ephorus, does mention the discredit brought on Sparta by the King's Peace (xv 9.5), but it is very much a secondary theme, overshadowed by Spartan abuses in Greece proper (cf. xv 19.4). See the Budé edition of Diodorus xv by Claude Vial (Paris 1977), xvi–xix.

³⁵ Cf. Jacoby, *RE* x.1707; Prandi (above, n. 1) 70–3. Note particularly the highly flattering picture of Pelopidas' diplomatic mission to Susa (Plut. *Pel.* 30), which basically reaffirmed the terms of the King's Peace, with Thebes playing the role of Sparta.

³⁶ *FGrH* 124 F 12; cf. S. M. Burstein, 'Alexander, Callisthenes and the sources of the Nile', *GRBS* xvii (1976) 135–46; Prandi (above, n. 1) 153–8.

³⁷ *FGrH* 124 F 9, 11 (the book numbers are self-consistent and credible).

³⁸ E. Schwartz, 'Kallisthenes' Hellenika', *Hermes* xxxv (1900) 106–30, esp. 109. 'für eine solche Schilderung ist kein leichter Anlass denkbar, als Alexanders Marsch durch Pamphylien im Jahr 333'.

³⁹ Cf. Wade-Gery (above, n. 2) 204. In recent years F. C. Schreiner, 'More anti-Thukydean studies in the Pentekontaetia', *SO* lii (1977) 19–38, esp. 23–9, has accepted Schwartz's location; but his grounds seem to me wholly subjective, and he argues (quite implausibly) that Callisthenes was the main source for the *Life of Cimon*. Schreiner cites G. Lombardo, *Cimone. Ricostruzione della biografia e discussioni storiografiche* (Rome 1934) 83, 133, who apparently endorsed Schwartz's views (*non vidi*).

from the preface of the *Hellenica*.⁴⁰ That is a pity. Jacoby did not dignify Schwartz's suggestion with serious argument. He rejected it a priori: 'ein Notbehelf, der meines Erachtens einer Widerlegung nicht bedarf'. In the context of Alexander's passage of Pamphylia, which Callisthenes treated in panegyric fashion, the excursus had no relevance or point. That is the sum of the criticism, and it is sad that it has had such a devastating effect. A more sober appraisal of the issue will establish that there was every reason for Callisthenes to digress and comment on the achievements of the past, so as to enhance the present glory of Alexander.

What cannot be denied is that the epic events of the fifth century were starkly relevant (in propaganda at least) to the aims and objectives of Alexander. The official pretext for the war, which he inherited from his father, was to take revenge for the injuries inflicted by the Persians upon Hellenic shrines, a manifesto which deliberately echoed the foundation oath of the Delian League.⁴¹ Athene, the principal victim of Xerxes in 480, was the patron goddess of the new crusade and it was to her that Alexander dedicated the first fruits of victory at the Granicus.⁴² War with Persia was seen as a continuous obligation, a legacy to the generation of Alexander from the heroic age of the Persian Wars. Alexander himself emphasised the continuity in great and small issues, when he promised the restoration of Plataea in recognition of the city's sacrifices in 479 or sent a portion of the spoils of Gaugamela to distant Croton in return for the services of Phayllus in the defence of Greece.⁴³ We should expect that his personal historian would duly record instances where he had continued or surpassed the great tradition.

The extant citations of Callisthenes' *Praxeis Alexandrou* are few and selective, but what emerges clearly is a conscious design to place the campaign of Alexander in a heroic context. There were antiquarian digressions devoted to the Homeric antecedents of the settlements visited by Alexander,⁴⁴ and there were also direct references to significant episodes of the Persian Wars. Callisthenes mentioned the Persian sack of Miletus in 494 BC and referred to the fine imposed upon the Athenian tragedian, Phrynichus, for his unseasonable dramatisation of the event.⁴⁵ It is likely enough that he made a feature of Alexander's comparatively magnanimous treatment of Miletus, which he spared and gave a formal grant of freedom, even though its surrender came at the eleventh hour, when the city walls were already breached.⁴⁶ His restraint and respect for past affliction could be honourably compared with the excesses of the Persians after the Ionian Revolt. Apollo, the patron of Miletus, was appropriately appreciative. According to Callisthenes the oracle at Branchidae, silent since its devastation in the time of Xerxes, now disgorged oracles attesting the divine sonship of Alexander.⁴⁷ The problem of the sacrilege of Xerxes does not concern us here. What matters is the propaganda for Alexander. By its sudden resurrection the oracle signalled a new age, the return of the god after his long exile throughout the Persian dominion.

⁴⁰ Meister (above, n. 2) 65, arguing that the *Hellenica* provided an ideal context for the old rhetorical *topos*, the comparison of the Peace of Callias and the King's Peace. But, on his view, Callisthenes denied the historicity of the Peace of Callias and there could be no direct comparison. Jacoby (*RE* x.1696) was more prudent: Callisthenes was sceptical about the Peace and confined himself to stressing the glorious consequences of the victory at the Eurymedon, which could be adversely compared with the King's Peace.

⁴¹ Diod. xvi 89.2; cf. Arr. ii 14.4; iii 18.12; Curt. iv 1. 10-11. See further H. Bellen, 'Die Rachegeanke in der griechisch-persischen Auseinandersetzung', *Chiron* iv (1974) 43-67.

⁴² Arr. i 16.7; Plut. *Alex.* 16.17 Cf. A. B. Bosworth, *Historical commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander* i (Oxford 1980) 127.

⁴³ Plut. *Alex.* 34.2-3; cf. J. R. Hamilton, *Plutarch: Alexander* (Oxford 1969) 91-2.

⁴⁴ *FGrH* 124 F 28, 32-3; 53-4; cf. Pédech (above n. 29) 45-9; Prandi (above, n.1) 76-82.

⁴⁵ Strabo xiv 1.7 (635) = *FGrH* 124 F 29; cf. Hdt. vi 21.2.

⁴⁶ Arr. i 19.4-6; Diod. xvii 22.3-5.

⁴⁷ Strabo xvii 1.43 (814) = *FGrH* 124 F 14a. On the attribution of the sack to Xerxes see, most recently, H. W. Parke, 'The massacre of the Branchidae', *JHS* cv (1985) 59-68, esp. 64-5.

In that context it made a great deal of sense to rehearse the glorious victory of Eurymedon.⁴⁸ In the Athenian rhetorical tradition that marked the high tide of success against the Persians. Now Callisthenes could show Alexander emulating and surpassing the triumphs of Cimon. He too reached the Eurymedon, but that was no term of conquest, only a passing episode in the greater war. He followed the Athenian fleet into Pamphylia, just as he later followed Heracles and Perseus to Siwah,⁴⁹ and he improved upon its performance. This was to be no temporary intrusion into alien territory. It was permanent conquest. That was underlined by Callisthenes in the most striking way. As Alexander marched along the Pamphylian coast between Phaselis and Perge, the sea itself recognised him as its new lord. The long arched rollers thrown up by the land breeze appeared to perform a kind of *proskynesis*,⁵⁰ the traditional act of obeisance offered before the Persian king by his subjects. Now the very elements recognised the charge of suzerainty. This demonstration occurred immediately after Alexander impinged on the Pamphylian Gulf at Phaselis,⁵¹ a little to the north of the Chelidonian islands, the limit of the Persian Empire as recognised in the Peace of Callias. Unlike the Athenians, Alexander did not recognise Persian sovereignty. He arrogated it for himself.

But, as we have seen, Callisthenes did not mention the Peace of Callias, which might have been seen as an effective propaganda point. That is a problem, but it is easily answered. There is another example of silence on his part which is highly pertinent to the argument. Callisthenes digressed on the fate of Sardes, the Lydian capital, which he claims was taken three times by storm: first by the Cimmerians, then by the Treres and Lycians and finally by the Persians under Cyrus.⁵² Once again there was presumably an encomiastic motive, to contrast the destruction of the past with Alexander's peaceful occupation of Sardes, which saw the return of the ancestral laws of the Lydians and the establishment of a state temple for Olympian Zeus.⁵³ But Callisthenes omitted the fourth capture of the city, by the insurgent Ionians (with Athenian assistance) in 498.⁵⁴ That was conscious. According to Herodotus the capture of Sardes resulted in the burning of the temple of Cybebe, which was the pretext for Persian retaliation against the shrines of Greece.⁵⁵ It was a very inopportune theme to recall in the context of Alexander's expedition, when it was a tenet of faith that the Persians had been the aggressors. That is explicitly stated in both versions of Alexander's letter to Darius in winter 333/2. It was Darius I and Xerxes who invaded both Greece and Macedon without provocation (οὐδὲν προηδίκημένοι).⁵⁶ Even the Thespian cavalry contingent saw itself as the instrument of vengeance, repaying the injuries suffered

⁴⁸ There were of course other contexts in which Callisthenes might have expounded the theme of Eurymedon. It is not impossible (as a referee has suggested) that the discussion occurred in an Introduction which delineated the previous history of Greco-Persian conflict. There is, however, no evidence that Callisthenes prefaced his work with a formal introduction (though it is admittedly likely) and no hint of what material might have been chosen for introductory purposes. On the other hand there is ample evidence for antiquarian and historical digressions in the course of the narrative, and I assume that the observations on the Eurymedon and its sequel came at the point when Alexander impinged on the field of the campaign. But, wherever Callisthenes placed his discussion, it remains true that the Peace of Callias was an uncomfortable theme, best buried in tactful silence.

⁴⁹ For the motif of heroic emulation in Callisthenes see *FGrH* 124 F 14a, with Pédech (above, n. 29) 49–51.

⁵⁰ *FGrH* 124 F 31 (Townley scholion on *Iliad* xiii 29); cf. Prandi (above, n. 1) 81–2, 97–8.

⁵¹ Arr. i 26.1–2; for the other sources see Bosworth (above, n. 42) 165–6. Divine intervention is implied (οὐκ ἔνευ τοῦ θείου: Arr.; cf. Plut. *Alex.* 17.6; Jos. *AJ* ii 348; App. *BC.* ii 149.622), but the recognition of sovereignty was an embellishment unique to Callisthenes.

⁵² Strabo xiii 4.8 (627) = *FGrH* 124 F 29.

⁵³ Arr. i 17.3–7; cf. Bosworth (above, n. 42) 128–30.

⁵⁴ The Ionians admittedly did not capture the acropolis of Sardes, which held out during the occupation and conflagration of the lower city (Hdt. v 100); but the same was apparently true of the Cimmerians, who also failed to capture the acropolis (Hdt. i 15). The citadel itself may only have fallen once—to Cyrus.

⁵⁵ Hdt. v 102.1 (emphasising the *casus belli*); vi 101.3 (revenge motive); cf. vii 8β.1.

⁵⁶ Arr. ii 14.4; Curt. iv 1.10–11.

by an earlier generation.⁵⁷ Callisthenes necessarily repeated that propaganda, and the burning of Sardes during the Ionian Revolt was an episode to be buried in discreet oblivion.

The encomiastic Athenian tradition of the Peace of Callias falls in the same category. What is emphasised in Alexander's propaganda is the continuity of the struggle against Persia. The injuries inflicted in 480/79 had never been adequately avenged, and Alexander presented himself as the champion of Athene, redressing the wrongs suffered at the hands of Xerxes and Mardonius. Those pretensions could not be reconciled with the Athenian rhetorical tradition. There, rightly or wrongly, the Peace of Callias was presented as the culmination of the war of revenge.⁵⁸ It was a recognition of the effectiveness of the Athenian retaliation; the King agreed to a restriction of his imperial boundaries and to keep his military forces within those limits. In the eyes of the Athenians they had brought the war of revenge to a glorious finale, avenged their wrongs and enshrined the new state of things in a formal peace. If the tradition was taken at face value, there was nothing for Alexander to avenge, and it is hardly surprising that Callisthenes said nothing about a formal peace.

What he did, it seems was to embroider another *topos* of Athenian rhetoric. Isocrates and (apparently) Plato had alleged that the great Athenian victories of the fifth century so demoralised the Persian King that he renounced any idea of aggression and kept his naval forces east of Phaselis.⁵⁹ That was much more accommodated to the propaganda of Alexander's reign. From the Athenian side there was no renunciation of hostility. Their military effort had a significant result in humiliating the King and securing the Aegean coast, but it left open the prospect of further campaigns. The Athenian successes under Cimon were a benchmark for a greater conqueror to surpass. Callisthenes therefore gave appropriate publicity to the campaign of the Eurymedon. It marked the high tide of Athenian successes in Asia Minor (the campaigns in Cyprus and Egypt came in another category), and it resulted in the collapse of the Persian will to resist. Subsequent forays by Pericles and Ephialtes east of the Chelidonian islands evoked no response. Against that background Alexander's achievements shone in a brighter light. Unlike the Athenians, who merely made incursions into the King's territory and had only an evanescent presence in Pamphylia, he annexed the entire area to his rule and the very sea accepted his sovereignty in an act of obeisance. Again, the Athenian actions, however glorious, merely deterred the King and left him passive in his domains, lacking the will or the potential for aggression, whereas Alexander challenged him directly, arrogating his empire. He surpassed the most glorious achievements of Athens and could still be seen as pursuing a traditional and indeterminate campaign of revenge.

The Eurymedon and its sequel was highly pertinent to Callisthenes' history of Alexander, and its context explains some of the peculiarities of Plutarch's exposition. What is at issue is the Athenian involvement in Pamphylia, which was the foil for Alexander's own actions there. Cimon's push to Phaselis and the Eurymedon was the great event in previous history, which Alexander emulated and surpassed. The two later actions by Pericles and Ephialtes, which Plutarch lists according to importance, not strict chronology, illustrated the effect of Cimon's victory and the lack of Athenian will to conquer the Pamphylian coast. That set the proper context for Alexander's triumphal progress. Callisthenes could stress the effortless capitulation of the area (glossing over less heroic aspects like the tenacious and unbroken resistance of the Persian garrison at

⁵⁷ Anth. Pal. vi 344: τιμωρούς προγόνων βάρβαρον εἰς Ἀσίην.

⁵⁸ Most explicit in Lycurg. i 73: καὶ τὸ κεφαλαῖον τῆς νίκης... ὄρους τοῖς βαρβάροις πῆξαντες... συνθήκας ἐποίησαντο κτλ. That was

probably the version of Phanodemus also (see above, p. 5).

⁵⁹ Isocr. vii (*Areop.*) 80 (cf. Meister [above, n. 2] 9–11); Plato *Menex.* 241e (perhaps referring to a *de facto* peace: cf. Meister 7–8).

Silyum)⁶⁰ and the permanent annexation of Persian territory. By the winter of 334/3 Alexander had passed the limit of Athenian campaigning on the coast of Asia Minor, and that was only the first act of the war of revenge. What was not relevant was a reference to the Peace of Callias, and Callisthenes passed it over in tactful silence as he did the Ionian attack upon Sardes.

III. SOME HISTORICAL IMPLICATIONS

As we have seen, Callisthenes' account of the Eurymedon and its sequel makes best sense when viewed against the background of Alexander's campaigns. The information provided about fifth century history is strictly limited and somewhat disappointing. The most significant result of this investigation concerns the debate about the authenticity of the Peace. Callisthenes did not argue against the existence of a peace with Persia. He omitted all reference to it because it was not easily reconcilable with the propaganda of his royal patron. If he had doubts about authenticity, they were better kept to himself, for even to mention the glorious tradition of the peace would have meant a weakening of Alexander's claim to be continuing an unbroken war of revenge. The one apparent sceptic, from the fourth century at least, was Theopompus of Chios, who included in the twenty-fifth book of his *Philippica* an attack on the Athenian panegyric tradition, assailing the authenticity of the oath of Plataea and the treaty with the barbarians and minimising the importance of Marathon.⁶¹ This was a famous digression which ranked with Thucydides' analysis of the affair of Harmodius and Aristogeiton and was widely read in the Roman period.⁶² Theopompus' doubts, taken with the apparent denial of Callisthenes, led scholars to posit a strong sceptical current of thought, a contemporary onslaught against the Peace of Callias. If Callisthenes is removed from the ranks of the sceptics, then Theopompus stands alone and the scattered testimonia of his excursus must be considered in isolation.

That does not help the debate over the Peace. There are two explicit references to Theopompus' criticisms. According to Harpocration he claimed that the treaty with the barbarian was a forgery because it was incised in Ionic (not Attic) lettering.⁶³ Not surprisingly it is usually assumed that the treaty Theopompus denounced was the formal Athenian record of the Peace of Callias, which Craterus transcribed at the end of the fourth century.⁶⁴ The definite article (τὰς πρὸς βάρβαρον συνθήκας) is often stressed. If Theopompus referred without qualification to the treaty with the barbarian, he can hardly have meant anything other than the Peace of Callias.⁶⁵ But there lies the problem. We cannot be sure that Harpocration is quoting with deadly verbatim accuracy. Even if he is, his citation is selective and deals only with Theopompus' comment about Ionic letters. The original may have been far more expansive, giving more detail about the historical context of the suspect treaty and then using the definite

⁶⁰ Arr. i 26.5. Alexander clearly left a good deal of unfinished business to be cleared up by Nearchus, whom he appointed satrap of Lycia and Pamphylia.

⁶¹ Theon, *Prog.* 2 (*Rhetores graeci* [ed. L. Spengel] ii. 67.22–9) = *FGrH* 115 F 153. The standard discussion is that of Connor (above, n. 9) 78–89; see also Meister (above, n. 2) 59–65.

⁶² Theon's reference is embedded in a list of classic models for rhetorical training. The immediate context is the technical excursus in historical narrative (πραγματικαὶ διηγήσεις). Theopompus is placed alongside Thucydides on the tyrannicides

and Herodotus' triple division of the known world (iv 42–5).

⁶³ Harpocr. s.v. Ἀττικοῖς γράμμασιν = *FGrH* 115 F 154. A further fragment of this discussion is apparently preserved in Photius and the *Suda* (*FGrH* 115 F 155); cf. Connor (above, n. 9) 89–94.

⁶⁴ See the full exposition of this view in Meister (above, n. 2) 60–5.

⁶⁵ So (e.g.) David Stockton, 'The Peace of Callias', *Historia* viii (1959) 62: 'It is hard to believe that it was not this, the big bubble, that Theopompus was out to prick'.

article resumptively ('the treaty which I mentioned'). Indeed there is a positive statement that Theopompus mentioned the name of the Persian signatory to the treaty. In the other direct reference to his excursus (in Theon's *Progymnasmata*) it is alleged that he impugned 'the treaty of the Athenians with King Darius'. Now the text of Theon is difficult and possibly corrupt, but (as has been repeatedly stated) there is no reason to delete the name Darius as an intrusive gloss.⁶⁶ Theopompus, then, directed his comments to a stele which recorded a treaty between the Athenians and a King Darius and was inscribed in the Ionic alphabet. That can hardly be the Peace of Callias as such, which on most calculations is believed to have been concluded in the reign of Artaxerxes I.⁶⁷ There are only two possibilities. The first, that there was an Athenian tradition of peace concluded (after Marathon) by Darius I, can safely be rejected,⁶⁸ as there is no hint in any source of such a Persian *volte face*. It was part of the authorised gospel that Darius was determined to the last to wipe out the disgrace of his defeat,⁶⁹ and there was no point in fabricating a treaty. The reign of Darius II is the only alternative. We must assume that in Theopompus' day there was on display a stele recording a treaty with King Darius and that its provisions were particularly flattering to the Athenians. It may be the authentic record (reinscribed in the fourth century) of some ephemeral compact made with Darius shortly after his accession (424/3),⁷⁰ the concessions to Athens reflecting the time of troubles which followed the death of Artaxerxes; or it may be an imaginative fourth century embellishment of an incomplete or relatively prosaic transaction. What we cannot infer is that the decree was a re-enactment of the Peace of Callias.⁷¹ It was a piece of documentation which happened to be vulnerable to subversive criticism and was attacked by Theopompus as a forgery. If we had more of the Atthidographic tradition, it might have been possible to see what encomiastic use the Athenians made of the rapprochement, real or imaginary, with Darius II, but, as things stand, there is no basis for speculation.

All that seems certain is that Theopompus did not impugn the Peace of Callias as such. That would explain the silence of Plutarch in the *Life of Cimon*. He knew his

⁶⁶ For discussion see Connor (above, n. 9) 79–82, enlarging on Wade-Gery (above, n. 2) 206–7. See also Badian (above, n. 3) 28 n. 51.

⁶⁷ The only other (outside) possibility is a dating to the reign of Xerxes, in the immediate aftermath of Eurymedon (so Badian [above, n. 3] 3–8). In that case the attested embassy of Callias to the court of Artaxerxes (Hdt. vii 151) is interpreted as a re-enactment of an earlier treaty (made under the aegis of Cimon and Callias) after the change of reign.

⁶⁸ This is a theoretical possibility only. To my knowledge it has never been seriously advanced.

⁶⁹ Hdt. vii 1.1. See the full rhetorical elaboration in Aristid. i (*Panath.*) 114–115.

⁷⁰ On the historical background see, most fully, D. M. Lewis, *Sparta and Persia* (Leiden 1977) 69–77; and, for a sceptical review of the evidence for a treaty in 424/3, see Meister 79–94. Despite the perversions of fact that surround it, most scholars accept that the reference in Andocides (iii [*De pace*] 29) to a perpetual peace negotiated by Epilycus does relate to some actual negotiation transacted around 424. The supposition is greatly strengthened by the recent discovery of a new fragment of the famous honorary decree for Heracleides (M. B. Walbank, 'Heracleides of Klazomenai: a

new join at the Epigraphical Museum', *ZPE* li [1983] 183–4; cf. D. M. Whitehead, *ZPE* lvii [1984] 145–6), which proves that the recipient was indeed Heracleides of Clazomenae. Heracleides served Athenian interests in negotiating *spondai* with the Great King and did so before he achieved Athenian citizenship (i.e. during the Peloponnesian War).

⁷¹ That is often argued (most recently by Badian [above, n. 3] 27–8) but there is no evidence. It seems unlikely, even if the Peace of Callias is historical, that a subsequent compact would merely have repeated the clauses of the original treaty without modification. The documentary record of the agreements between the Spartans and the Persian court as preserved in Thucydides viii is interesting evidence of the changes which political circumstances might impose within a matter of weeks (cf. Lewis [above, n. 70] 90–107). Wade-Gery (above, n. 2) 210 claimed that a re-enactment of an existing treaty would be a less startling omission in Thucydides than a totally new agreement (for other adherents to this view see Meister [above, n. 2] 50). Possibly so, but it is merely a matter of degree. On any hypothesis of a peace in 424/3 Thucydides (iv 50) recorded the abortive embassy of 425/4 but ignored the successful negotiations with Darius.

Theopompus and in another context echoed the disparaging comments on Marathon.⁷² Yet in his discussion of the Peace of Callias, which he identified as a problematic area, there is no reference to Theopompus, whose excursus was almost required reading in the schools. It would follow that Theopompus did not refer explicitly to the Peace of Callias but addressed his criticism to a later compact with Darius II. By the end of the fourth century there was also an epigraphic record of the Peace of Callias for Craterus to copy. One assumes that it was inscribed in Attic letters but it is not a necessary conclusion. What is important is to acknowledge that there was scope for any number of treaties, real or imagined, which might have been recorded for public edification in fourth century Athens,⁷³ and it is most dangerous, given our pathetically inadequate documentation, to conflate them. As far as the Peace of Callias is concerned, we cannot speak of any denial of historicity during the fourth century. The problems seems to have come later. Plutarch was puzzled by Callisthenes' omission of the Peace in a context where he expected some reference to it, and he addressed the explicit evidence of Craterus to counter the implicit argument from silence. Whether it was an original approach to the problem or not is irrelevant here. What seems undeniable—and highly important—is that we have no attested attack on the Peace of Callias that can be attributed to the fifth or fourth centuries BC

Finally we should ask what historical consequences for the fifth century emerge from Plutarch's citation of Callisthenes. The principal factor, in my opinion, is the deliberate limitation of the discussion to Pamphylia and the boundaries of Persian military activity. Cimon's crowning victory at the Eurymedon resulted in the renunciation of further action in the west by the King, so that *as a matter of fact* his fleets remained east of the Chelidonians. There is nothing about a *de facto* cessation of hostilities, which appears so frequently in recent scholarship. The cessation is one-sided. The King no longer defended his territory, even against Athenian actions which must be seen as a clear provocation. Both Pericles and Ephialtes sailed beyond the Chelidonian islands. Ephialtes' expedition clearly came between the Eurymedon and his death in 461, but the actions of Pericles are undatable and I see no way of dating them. It is possible that he operated in the late 460s, soon after he attained the statutory age for the generalship,⁷⁴ but that is only one possibility. During the long Athenian involvement with the Egyptian insurgency there was ample opportunity for a brief foray against the Pamphylian coast (the Samian revolt seems to me a much less likely context),⁷⁵ and our sources for the period are too scanty for us to evince surprise that there is no record of it outside Plutarch.⁷⁶ Nor is there any possibility of delineating the type of action

⁷² Plut. *Mor.* 862D: criticism of unnamed authorities who denigrated Marathon as 'a brief clash with the barbarians on their landing'. For the attribution to Theopompus see Jacoby, *FGrH* iiD.380; Connor (above, n. 9) 88; and, on Plutarch's use of Theopompus, particularly in the *Life of Cimon*, see Connor 112–6.

⁷³ Note Demosthenes' ironical reference to Aeschines having read texts of the decrees of Miltiades and Themistocles (*Dem.* xix 303) alongside the ephebic oath. That would have been not unlike Lycurgus' invocation of the Oath of Plataea (i 80–2), which comes a few sections after the reference to the Peace of Callias (i 73). Had it suited his purposes, Lycurgus might have had the entire treaty read out to the court.

⁷⁴ So R. Meiggs, *The Athenian empire* (Oxford, 1972) 79; Badian (above, n. 3) 9–11.

⁷⁵ Thucydides i 116.3 records a brief and abortive foray in the direction of Caunus and Caria

which Pericles undertook with sixty ships. It is just possible that Callisthenes exaggerated this action into a push against Pamphylia, much as Stesimbrotus (*Plut. Per.* 26.1 = *FGrH* 107 F 8) made Cyprus the ultimate objective (Wade-Gery [above, n. 2] 203 n. 3, 221; most recently Prandi [above, n. 1] 54–5); but I see no reason to opt for this alternative.

⁷⁶ Note for instance Thuc. i 104.2, where it is recorded parenthetically that the Athenians and their allies were involved in Cyprus with a force of 200 ships at the time that they received the appeal from Inaros. We have no idea how they came to be there or how long they had been operating. Pamphylia admittedly is not one of the scenes of operation in the Erechtheid casualty list (Meiggs/Lewis no. 33), which most probably dates to 460; but there is surely scope for a foray in that area during the following years, when the Athenian presence in Egypt was probably much reduced.

involved. It has recently been argued that Ephialtes and Pericles carried out naval sweeps east of Phaselis without attacking the King's territory or taking plunder—a studied provocation but not a formal breach of the Peace.⁷⁷ I do not think that one can extract such an inference from the text. Plutarch is emphasising the *Persian* inactivity. The King failed to take action against two successive Athenian incursions. The fact that nothing more explicit is reported does not entail that there was no landing or looting. There may well have been and it may have been mentioned by Callisthenes. For Plutarch the issue was simply the King's quiescence, despite provocation. Callisthenes could have been more specific, stressing the sporadic and inconclusive nature of the Athenian actions, as opposed to Alexander's complete annexation of Pamphylia; but in the absence of a more detailed digest from Plutarch there is no possibility of fleshing out the bare bones of the story. It is a melancholy reminder what an incomplete and fragmentary record we have of the *pentekontaetia*.

The conclusion for the Peace of Callias is simple. Callisthenes falls out of the picture. He did not affirm or deny the authenticity of the Peace but avoided any reference to it, and the details he gives may (at a pinch) be marshalled either in support or refutation of a formal treaty after Eurymedon. The dilemma remains essentially what it was. In fourth century Athens there was a panegyric tradition of a formal peace with Persia, the terms of which were recorded on a stele in public view, but there is no reference to it in any fifth century source, most notably Thucydides, who could—and should—have mentioned it on any number of occasions. That is a nasty enough complex of problems. It does not need the further complication of a fourth-century sceptical tradition or the hypothesis of a *de facto* peace, neither of which can be conjured from the text of Plutarch or laid at Callisthenes' door.

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⁷⁷ Badian (above, n. 3) 9–10.